When you lease a new car, you may assume that the lease agreement is between you and the dealership. But the arbitration clause that is typically included in the agreement may reach further, particularly when the provision includes the vehicle manufacturer.
A recent California Court of Appeal decision illustrates the importance of reading an arbitration clause carefully. In Srivastava v. BMW of North America, LLC, the court held that the automaker could enforce an arbitration provision in a vehicle lease even though BMW was not a party to the lease.
The reason was simple: the lease specifically identified BMW as a party entitled to invoke the arbitration provision.
In July 2023, Abhishek Srivastava leased a new 2024 BMW iX xDrive50, a luxury electric SUV, from BMW of Fremont.
According to a lawsuit he filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court, the vehicle had serious problems, including charging difficulties, trouble starting, and a “thermal event and/or fire.” His complaint said his dealership and other authorized BMW repair facilities were unable to fix the vehicle, which remained inoperable.
Srivastava sued BMW of North America under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, commonly known as the Lemon Law.
Among other things, he alleged that the manufacturer breached the implied warranty of merchantability, failed to make timely repairs, failed to repurchase or replace the vehicle, and breached its express warranty.
BMW responded by asking the trial court to compel arbitration of the dispute.
The trial court refused to do so, relying on a 2023 appellate decision involving Ford Motor Co. and concluding that BMW could not enforce an arbitration agreement to which it was not a party. BMW appealed.
In July 2025, while BMW’s appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the appellate court’s holding that an automobile manufacturer generally cannot use equitable estoppel to force arbitration of a consumer’s Song-Beverly claims when the manufacturer is not a party to the sales contract.
(“Equitable estoppel” says a person cannot go back on their word or change their position if doing so would unfairly harm someone who relied on their previous actions or statements.)
The lease Srivastava signed contained a particularly broad arbitration provision. It stated that either the consumer or the company could elect binding arbitration of a “dispute,” which it defined to include claims “whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise” relating to the lease, the consumer’s relationship with the company, the purchase or condition of the vehicle, and the vehicle’s warranties.
The provision defined “we” and “us” to include BMW of North America, LLC. That language became decisive.
BMW abandoned its equitable-estoppel argument in its appeal but continued to argue that it was entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Srivastava and his dealership.
Ordinarily, only parties to an arbitration agreement can enforce it. California law recognizes an exception for a third-party beneficiary – someone for whose benefit the contracting parties made the agreement.
Relying on the express language of the lease, the appellate justices concluded that BMW qualified. BMW was not merely a manufacturer whose interests happened to be affected by the contract; it was specifically included within the definition of “we” and “us,” and the arbitration provision expressly gave the defined parties the right to elect arbitration.
The court also distinguished the California Supreme Court’s recent Ford decision. In that case, the manufacturer was not party to the sales contracts, was not specifically named in them, and the contracts did not mention arbitration of warranty claims against the manufacturer.
Here, BMW was named in the lease, and the arbitration provision expressly covered disputes involving the condition of the vehicle and its warranties.
The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the trial court’s ruling that BMW could not compel arbitration and remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the delegation clause was unconscionable.
The justices then addressed Srivastava’s claim that the arbitration provision’s delegation clause was unconscionable because of its delegation clause, which stated that an arbitrator, rather than a court, would decide certain preliminary questions, such as whether a particular dispute must be arbitrated.
The lease’s definition of “dispute” expressly included questions concerning the “interpretation, enforceability and scope” of the arbitration provision.
The justices said a court cannot submit an unconscionability challenge to an arbitrator without first determining whether the delegation clause itself is enforceable.
Because the trial court had never decided that question, the appellate court sent the case back for the trial court to decide whether the delegation clause is unconscionable. The appellate court expressed no opinion on that issue.
For consumers, the lesson of Srivastava is to look closely at an arbitration clause to see who can enforce the agreement, the claims it covers, and who decides whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.
For businesses, the decision underscores the importance of carefully drafting contract language to determine whether a dispute will be covered by an arbitration provision at all.